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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Courts of Appeals split about whether state 
felony drug convictions, which were punishable only as misdemeanors 
under federal law, constituted aggravated felonies under immigration 
law.1 The controversy was based upon the interpretation of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Under the Act, an alien 
who is convicted of an “aggravated felony” is automatically deported 
from the United States.2 According to the INA, an aggravated felony 
includes “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . . including a 
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).”3 
Although the INA does not define “illicit trafficking,” Title 18 of the 
United States Code defines “the term ‘drug trafficking crime’ [as] any 
felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. [§] 
801 et seq.).”4 Although the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) is a 
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 1. United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308, 310 (8th Cir. 1997), quoted in United 
States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that Congress made a 
deliberate choice to include, as “aggravated felonies,” state felony convictions that would 
qualify only as misdemeanors under federal law); Aguirre v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Serv., 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding, in contrast to the Fifth and Eighth Circuit, that 
nationwide uniformity is important and state felonies are not aggravated felonies if the 
conviction would only amount to a misdemeanor under federal law). 
 2. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 3. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43)(B). 
 4. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). 
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federal statute, the INA’s definitions of aggravated felonies expressly 
include crimes “whether in violation of state and federal law.”5 
Because the INA was intended to include state convictions, the Court 
needed to clarify whether an “aggravated felony” under the INA 
included a felony conviction by state court that under federal law 
would be classified as only a misdemeanor. 
In Lopez v. Gonzales and Toledo-Flores v. United States the 
Supreme Court answered this question.6 Two non-citizens faced 
deportation for conviction for drug related offenses. Lopez was 
convicted of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine, a felony 
under South Dakota law. In 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) initiated removal proceedings against Lopez, and he 
subsequently filed for a cancellation of the removal under INA § 
240(a). However, Lopez was forbidden from cancelling the removal 
because of his status as an aggravated felon.7 Lopez appealed the 
denial of his application, arguing that his South Dakota conviction 
was not an aggravated felony because it was not a felony under the 
CSA. 
Toledo-Flores was convicted of felonious possession of cocaine in 
Texas. He was sentenced to two years in prison following his guilty 
plea for improper entry into the United States. His sentence was 
enhanced because of his prior aggravated felony conviction under the 
federal sentencing guidelines.8 Toledo-Flores also argued that his 
conviction, although a felony under Texas state law, did not qualify as 
an aggravated felony under the CSA. Because the cases posed the 
same legal question, they were consolidated for judgment. The 
Supreme Court was asked to resolve whether a state felony 
conviction for a drug-related offense qualifies as an aggravated felony 
when the conviction under federal law would constitute only a 
misdemeanor. 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, the Circuits were 
inconsistent in their treatment of state court felony convictions. The 
Fifth and Eighth Circuits consistently held that a state felony 
conviction, regardless of the treatment under federal law, was an 
 
 5. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43) (penultimate sentence). 
 6. Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2006). 
 7. I.N.A. § 240(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). 
 8. U.S.S.G. § 2l1.2(b)(10(C). 
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“aggravated felony.”9 The Eighth Circuit stated that “Congress made a 
deliberate policy decision to include as an ‘aggravated felony’ a drug 
crime that is a felony under state law but only a misdemeanor under 
the CSA.”10 On the other hand, the Ninth circuit held “a state drug 
offense is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes only if it 
would be punishable as a felony under federal drug laws or the crime 
contains a trafficking element.”11 The Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits 
agreed with this interpretation.12 
II.  DEFINING “AGGRAVATED FELONY” UNDER IMMIGRATION LAW 
In an 8-1 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the 
Fifth Circuit’s ruling and agreed with the Second, Third, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits, holding that a state felony conviction, which would 
have been punishable as misdemeanor under federal law, is not an 
aggravated felony for purposes of the INA.13 Although Lopez and 
Toledo-Flores’s cases were consolidated, the Supreme Court found 
that Toledo-Flores’s case was moot. Certiorari was improperly 
granted because the petitioner had already served his aggravated 
felony sentence.14 Although Toledo-Flores’s appeal concerned the 
enhancement of his sentence under Federal Sentencing Guidelines as 
a result of his prior state conviction being deemed an aggravated 
felony, his sentence was inactive by the time the Supreme Court heard 
his case. Conversely, the Court did decide the Lopez controversy even 
though he had already been deported. The Court reasoned that Lopez 
could still benefit from a ruling because he could file an application 
for cancellation of removal.15 
In Lopez’s case, the immigration judge initially held that Lopez’s 
state offense was not an aggravated felony because the conduct was 
not punishable under the CSA.16 However, the same judge reversed 
that decision when the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
 
 9. Lopez v. Gonzalez, 417 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 
251 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 10. United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308, 310 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 11. Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 912 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 12. Aguirre v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996); Gonzales-
Gomez v. Achim, 441 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2006); Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Palacios-Suarez, 418 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 13. Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2006). 
 14. Toledo-Flores v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 638 (2006). 
 15. Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 629. 
 16. Id. at 628. 
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conformed to the Eighth Circuit’s precedent, which considered state 
felony drug convictions to be aggravated felonies.17 As a result, Lopez 
was unable to apply for a cancellation of his removal, and the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA’s decision.18 The Supreme 
Court subsequently granted certiorari. The Government argued for a 
unique interpretation of the statutory language of the INA, which 
defined a drug trafficking crime as “any felony punishable under the 
Controlled Substances Act.”19 According to the Government’s 
reading, any offense that was both a felony under state law and 
contained conduct that was punishable under the CSA would 
constitute an aggravated felony.20 The Supreme Court disagreed, and 
ultimately held that Lopez’s conviction of possession of a controlled 
substance did not contain the necessary trafficking element to qualify 
as an “aggravated felony.” 
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter relied upon the plain 
meaning of the word “trafficking.” Lopez was charged with aiding and 
abetting another individual’s cocaine possession, which is a felony 
under South Dakota state law. However, this conduct does not fall 
within the realm of “drug trafficking” because “ordinarily, ‘trafficking’ 
means some sort of commercial dealing.”21 Here, that dealing was not 
present. Lopez’s conduct that resulted in the South Dakota conviction 
did not contain any trafficking elements. In a footnote, the Court 
explained that some forms of illicit trafficking do contain commercial 
elements, such as recidivist possession, but the majority was unwilling 
to include all possession offenses within the class of drug-trafficking 
offenses due to a few exceptions.22 
In addition, the Court used the traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation to refute the Government’s definition of aggravated 
felony. It highlighted that Congress was able to define when 
aggravated felonies were expressly based on convictions under state 
law in other parts of 18 U.S.C. § 924. “[T]he implication confirms that 
the reference solely to a ‘felony punishable under the [CSA]’ in § 
924(c)(2) is to a crime punishable as a felony under the federal Act.”23 
 
 17. See Matter of Yanez-Garcia, 23 I&N Dec. 390 (2002). 
 18. Gonzalez, 417 F.3d at 934. 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). 
 20. Brief of Respondents at 18, Lopez v. Gonzalez, 417 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-
2397). 
 21. Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 630. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 631 (emphasis added). 
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The deliberate choice of language within the same Act sheds light on 
the intention of Congress to include only offenses that would be 
punishable as felonies under the CSA, as opposed to state felonies 
that are punishable under the CSA only as misdemeanors. The 
Court’s rationale is taken directly from the petitioner’s brief. 
Petitioner asserted that Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 924 expressly used the 
language “state law convictions” in subsections (g)(3) and (k)(2).24 
When placed in juxtaposition with subsection § 924(c), it becomes 
clear that “Congress understood drug offenses ‘punishable under the 
Controlled Substances Act’ not to include state offenses.”25 Here, the 
Court agreed with this reasoning and determined Congress’ intent 
from the deliberate use of language in parallel subsections within § 
924. 
The Government also wanted the court to view § 924’s definition 
of “sentence” as two distinct parts: (1) “felony” and (2) “punishable 
under the CSA.” Once separated, the state conviction need only be a 
felony and contain conduct punishable under the CSA; the CSA need 
not punish such behavior as a felony as well. However, the Court 
disagreed with this reading. “The Government stresses that the text 
does not read ‘punishable as a felony.’”26 Instead, the Court reasoned, 
“[w]e do not use a phrase like ‘felony punishable under the [CSA]’ 
when we mean to signal or allow a break between the noun ‘felony’ 
and the contiguous modifier ‘punishable under the CSA.’ . . .”27 The 
Court found no apparent reason to separate a noun from the modifier 
next to it.28 As a result, the Court refused to hold that a misdemeanor 
punishable under the Act should be considered an aggravated 
felony.29 In order to be deemed an aggravated felony, the offense must 
be a felony that is punishable as a felony under the CSA.30 
Nevertheless, the Court did not require that every state conviction 
have an identical federal counterpart to suffice as an aggravated 
felony. Instead, “a state offense whose elements include the elements 
of a felony punishable under the CSA is an aggravated felony.”31 
 
 24. Brief of Petitioner at 23, Lopez v. Gonzalez, 417 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-2397). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 631. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 633. 
 31. Id. at 631. 
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The Government’s argument relied on the penultimate sentence 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), where the definition of aggravated felonies 
included crimes “whether in violation of state and federal law”32 to 
support its interpretation of the INA. However, the Court determined 
that the Government’s contention was without merit and found no 
evidence that this last sentence was intended to change the definition 
of “aggravated felony” that Congress incorporated from Title 18 § 
924(c)(2).33 The Government admitted “it has never begun a 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) where the underlying 
‘drug trafficking crime’ was a state felony but a federal 
misdemeanor.”34 The penultimate sentence opens the door for state 
convictions to be treated as aggravated felonies under the INA, but 
the state felony convictions cannot be based on criminal conduct that 
would only suffice to sustain a misdemeanor conviction under federal 
law.35 
Lastly, the Court believed that the Government’s interpretation of 
the INA would create an unpredictable situation because the 
determination of aggravated felonies would be based upon different 
state criminal classifications. Congress specifically incorporated its 
own statutory scheme from Title 18 when it defined a drug trafficking 
crime under § 924(c)(2). The majority asserted that Congress would 
not have gone through this trouble if it “meant courts to ignore [that 
scheme] whenever a State chose to punish a given act more heavily.”36 
Here, the Court identified the potential consequences of this 
approach. If a state punishes possession of one gram of contraband as 
a felony, then a state convict is subject to mandatory deportation 
because, like Lopez, he will be unable to petition for cancellation of 
removal.37 However, the CSA expressly excludes from the list of 
deportable controlled substance violations “single offense[s] involving 
possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less.”38 Even though the 
federal government had deliberately excluded this type of possession 
offense as grounds for automatic deportation, state statutory schemes 
would be capable of overriding congressional intent. The Supreme 
Court did not want the determination of whether an offense is an 
 
 32. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). 
 33. Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 632. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 633. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). 
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“aggravated felony” to turn on the specific statutory scheme of each 
state. As a result, here, the Court followed Congress’ intent to define 
aggravated felonies in accordance with federal law. 
As the lone dissenter, Justice Thomas was not persuaded by the 
majority’s reasoning. He did not agree that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 
requires the Board of Immigration to define felonies according to 
federal law. Like the Government, Thomas relied on the plain 
meaning of the word felony, which is any crime that is punishable by 
more than one year in prison.39 Also, Justice Thomas disagreed with 
the majority’s claim that all trafficking offenses must contain a 
commercial element.40 In fact, by the majority’s own admission, some 
possession crimes fall within the definition of “illicit trafficking.” 
These possession offenses are not merely a small class of exceptions, 
but “must include every type of possession offense under the CSA, so 
long as the offender has had a previous possession offense.” The CSA 
includes repeat possession offenders within the class of “illicit 
trafficking.”41 He believed that the majority overlooked these 
important exceptions, and he agreed with the Government that any 
state felony conviction that is also punishable under the CSA is an 
aggravated felony. 
Furthermore, Justice Thomas was not convinced that the various 
state statutory schemes create inconsistent results. He rejected the 
hypothetical offered by the majority as outrageous because no state 
would ever punish the possession of one gram of a controlled 
substance as a felony. In fact, it would be rare for the state and federal 
statutory scheme to depart dramatically: “[t]he mere possibility that a 
case could fall into this small gap and lead to removal provides no 
ground for the court to depart from the plain meaning of § 
924(c)(2).”42 Justice Thomas explained that the majority’s decision will 
more significantly affect state removal proceedings because federal 
law tends to treat possession of large quantities of a controlled 
substance more harshly than state law.43 Regardless, Justice Thomas’s 
reasoning did not sway the other eight justices. 
III.  IMPACT AND CONCLUSION 
 
 39. Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 634 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 635–36. 
 41. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). 
 42. Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 637 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. 
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The Supreme Court’s decision will affect many immigrants with 
drug related convictions. The Los Angeles Times reported, “[f]rom 
mid-1997 to May 2006, federal officials used the aggravated felony 
provisions to deport an estimated 156,713 people through court 
proceedings, according to the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse.”44 Because so many immigrants are deported as a 
result of criminal convictions, the Court’s ruling will provide some 
immigrants with the chance to file a cancellation of removal 
application. However, all immigrants will not be affected by the 
change in deportation procedures. “[The Lopez v. Gonzales] decision 
does not affect illegal immigrants, who can be deported simply by 
virtue of being in the United States. It also doesn’t affect naturalized 
citizens, who are treated like all other citizens and cannot be deported 
for criminal convictions.”45 With respect to legal immigrants, the 
definition of “aggravated felony” has been revised to create 
consistency amongst the circuits. Automatic deportation will not be 
required if a legal immigrant is convicted of a possession offense in a 
state whose statutory scheme punishes the offense as a felony, as long 
as the offense in not also a felony under federal law. 
This case represents the second time in two years that the highest 
court has overruled the executive branch’s interpretation of an 
immigration law. In 2004, the Court held that driving under the 
influence was not a crime of violence that required automatic 
deportation.46 Additionally, on December 5, 2006, the Supreme Court 
heard oral arguments in Duenas-Alvarez v. Gonzales, a case involving 
a Peruvian citizen who was found guilty under California law of 
aiding and abetting the theft of an automobile.47 The Ninth Circuit 
overturned the automatic deportation order in Duenas-Alvarez, 
holding that the California offense does not categorically qualify as a 
“theft offense” because it punishes a broader class of theft than 
defined under federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)(G).48 In Lopez, the 
Supreme Court held that federal law should be used to define what 
constitutes an aggravated felony. In deciding Duenas-Alvarez, the 
 
 44. David G. Savage, Court Bars Automatic Deportation in Drug Cases, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
6, 2006, at A1. 
 45. Bob Egelko, Legal immigrants can fight drug-related deportations; High court rules state 
crimes not grounds for automatic expulsion, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 6, 2006, at A16. 
 46. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 47. Duenas-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 176 F. App’x. 820 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 
35 (Sept. 26, 2006). 
 48. Id. 
 2007] LOPEZ V. GONZALES & TOLEDO-FLORES V. UNITED STATES 9 
Court should be consistent, and hold that an over-inclusive state 
criminal statute cannot be used to require automatic deportation 
unless the conduct would have also been punishable “as a felony” 
under federal law. 
 
